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 Infrastructure Security and Nuclear Power 
Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) 
By Friedrich Steinhausler 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed 
here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
Nuclear power, national security and covert nuclear weapon programs have been intrinsically 
linked in the past. Such was the case in India, Israel, South Africa and Pakistan. At least thirteen 
Middle Eastern countries either announced new plans to explore atomic energy or revived pre-
existing nuclear power programs between February 2006 and January 2007. The Middle East 
and North Africa represent a region with countries (Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia) 
representing a wide range of nuclear capabilities.  
In view of the ongoing debate about the Iranian nuclear power program, strategic stability in the 
Persian Gulf depends inter alia on the nuclear capabilities of these countries. Coupled with the 
rampant political instability and national nuclear issues shrouded in a great deal of secrecy, this 
provides a fertile breeding ground for speculations and hypotheses concerning the potential for 
covert nuclear weapon programs.  
In the following article, the nuclear infrastructure in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia willbe 
reviewed to provide a basis for an objective assessment of the future risk of these countries 
engaging in a covert nuclear weapon program. 
Algeria 
Algeria considers electricity production and desalination by nuclear power an important 
component in its national energy policy. The country is on the forefront of nuclear science in the 
Arab community. Thereby it shares similar views with Iran in claiming its right to establish the 
complete nuclear fuel cycle. 
Although Algeria is a constitutional republic, in reality the military complex represents the major 
power in the national political decision-making process. Due to its increasing revenue from oil and 
gas, Algeria has a current budgetary surplus of about US$20 billion. 
National security is a problem: The country suffers from extensive terrorist activities by extremist 
groups, such as Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), resulting 
in over 100,000 dead so far. 
The current situation in the country with regard to its nuclear ambitions and capabilities, based on 
open literature, is characterized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of Nuclear Characteristics of Algeria 
Parameter Characterization 
U supply 56,000 tons of uranium deposits in Eglab, Ougarta, southern Tassili, 
Timgaounine, Tinef, Abankor, Tahaggart 
700,000 t phosphate rock /year 
Fuel fabrication UDEC, managed by Unite De Recherché En Genie at Dourera; pilot plant 
(Argentinean design); fuel elements for a variety of reactors 
Reactors NUR Multipurpose Reactor 
1MW pool type research reactor (19.75% U 235), provided by INVAP, 
Argentina  (1989), managed by Unite De Recherché En Genie Nucleaire 
(Urgn) 
Es Salam, located at Ain Oussera near Birin; 15MW heavy-water reactor 
(3% U 235), provided by: China (1992), managed by Centre De 
Development Des Systemes Energetiques 
Reprocessing No industrial-scale operations 
Pilot-scale system supplied by China, managed by: Centre de 
Development des Systèmes Energétiques 
Suspected to separate Pu spent fuel since the early 1990s in plant next to 
the reactor at Ain Oussera, based on satellite photographs 
Waste disposal 11 tanks, located at Ain Oussera, supplied by China, managed by Centre 
de Development des Systèmes Energétiques 
Clandestine nuclear program Construction of heavy water reactor Es Salam (U.S. Intelligence, 1991) 
Intention “to produce military grade plutonium” (CESID, 1998) 
Pu production capability 3-5 kg/year 
Foreign support United States, France 2007;  Argentina 2008 
Official support for Iranian 
nuclear program 
Yes 
IAEA assistance Development of uranium prospecting and analysis 
Removal and recovery of uranium from phosphoric acid 
Main nuclear research facilities Centre de Recherche et D`Exploration des Matériaux Algiers 
Centre de Développement de Matériaux Algiers 
Discovery of undeclared material 3 kg of enriched uranium, supplied by China 
Declared nuclear ambitions First nuclear power plant in operation by 2020 
Signatory to Treaties NPT (1992),  CTBT (1996) 
IAEA Safeguards 
State Party to the Pelindaba Treaty[1] 
Algeria could represent a proliferation risk in the future for the following reasons: 
• Algeria signed secret nuclear agreements with China and Argentina in the past, enabling 
it to gain access to advanced nuclear technology. 
• IAEA revealed the existence of three kilogram of enriched uranium, which had not been 
declared by Algeria. 
• Algeria joined the NPT[2] only about ten years after it had signed the agreement with 
China and Argentina. 
• Algeria is unlikely to forego the right to enrichment and reprocessing processes in view of 
its stance on being legally entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. 
• Algeria has access to significant uranium supplies either through deposits, or phosphate 
ore, and has access to over 50 kg of Pu through its civilian reactor at Es Salam. 
• Algeria has access to state-of-the-art nuclear technology due to technical assistance by 
the IAEA. Since December 2007 Algeria has benefited further from extensive technology 
transfers from France in the fields of nuclear research, nuclear electricity production, 
uranium exploration and exploitation. 
• Algeria has excellent trained manpower in nuclear sciences and engineering 
In case of a political decision for engaging in a covert nuclear weapon program, Algeria would 
need to set up an industrial scale reprocessing plant in order to close the national nuclear fuel 
cycle. 
Egypt  
Egypt became one of the advocates for a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), when 
Anwar Al-Sadat came to power in the 1970s. If there had indeed been plans for a military nuclear 
weapon program as reported, these plans were abandoned upon ratifying the NPT in 1981. 
Over the past thirty years, Egypt developed a significant nuclear infrastructure, comprised of 
several thousand scientists and technicians, as well as multiple nuclear research facilities. 
However, it does not have any power reactor and failed to establish an industrial scale mining, 
milling, enrichment and reprocessing industry. It operates a functioning fuel fabrication plant for 
its ETRR-2 reactor. Egypt claims officially that it is not pursuing uranium enrichment. However, 
there is no information on the type of reactor to be considered (Unat, LEU) in the future or the 
extent of indigenous manufacture of fuel rods. Furthermore, Egypt has a dual-use nuclear fuel 
cycle: 
1. ETTR-2, 22MW pool type light water reactor, burns enriched uranium and produces 
plutonium; detection of any any future covert irradiation of uranium targets may pose a 
problem; 
2. Technically covert reprocessing of irradiated targets or fuel at a laboratory scale is 
possible at its Hot Cell Laboratory and Waste Management Centre (HLWMC). 
Egypt has a history of religious fundamentalism linked to terrorism, leading back to the early 
stages of the Al Qaeda organization. In the recent past it has experienced some major terror 
attacks in tourist centres and its capital. 
The current situation in the country with regard to its nuclear ambitions and capabilities, based on 
open literature, is characterized in Table 2. 
Egypt could represent a proliferation risk in the future for the following reasons: 
• Its national scientific manpower is large and has access to multiple modern nuclear 
research facilities, addressing the complete nuclear fuel cycle. 
• Egypt has significant conventional and unconventional uranium reserves and will be 
supported by China in uranium mining operations in the future. 
• Its ETRR-2 reactor produces about 6 kg of Pu per year and its staff has training 
opportunities with plutonium extraction at the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant and the Hot 
Laboratory and Waste Management Center. 
• Egypt refuses to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, since two of its nuclear partners 
(China and Russia) will provide nuclear assistance nevertheless. 
• Egypt seeks international nuclear contacts and has been successful with China, France 
and Australia in the recent past. Egypt aims for a major civilian nuclear program, 
comprised of ten nuclear power plants. This could either reflect an effort to counter an 
increasing energy shortage, or it views nuclear power as a prerequisite for achieving 
parity with Israel in strategic terms. 
At present, Egypt has no industrial scale nuclear capabilities, which would enable it to engage in 
a covert nuclear weapon program in the near term. 
Table 2: Summary of Nuclear Characteristics of Egypt 
Parameter Characterization 
U supply (a) Heap leach mining in Sinai and Eastern Deserts; 
(b) Uranium deposits in Gabal Gattar, El Miskat/El Erediya, Um Ara, El 
Atshan, Wadi Nasib; 
(c) Phosphate deposits (65 ppm of uranium) in the Western Desert, Nile 
Valley, and the Red Sea Coast (appr.33 000 t uranium) 
(d) Egyptian Monazite Sands deposit (3,000 t    monazite) at Rosetta 
Beach (6.05% thorium, 0.46% uranium) 
Fuel fabrication Nuclear Fuel Research Laboratory at the Nuclear Research Center 
(NRC), Inshas (over 0.1 tons of heavy metal/year) 
Reactors Research reactor ETRR-1 (2 MW, tank-type VVR, 4.5 kg fuel ( 
enrichment: 10%), USSR) 
Research reactor ETRR-2 (22 MW, swimming pool-type, light water, up 
to 30 fuel elements, enrichment  20 % U308), China) 
Both reactors are located at Inshas; operational since 1962 and 1997, 
respectively 
Reprocessing No declared reprocessing capability, but Hot Laboratory and Waste 
Management Center (HLWMC) carries out reprocessing-related 
activities 
Waste disposal Waste treatment and analysis of irradiated material at Hot Laboratory 
and Waste Management Center (HLWMC;), Inchas 
Clandestine nuclear program Suspected prior to 1970s 
Pu production capability Approximately 6 kg/year 
Foreign support Since 1960´s China (supply of research reactor) 
2008: 
France (transfer of nuclear technology) 
2009: Australia (plans for nuclear power reactor at Dabaa) 
Official support for Iranian nuclear 
program 
No 
IAEA assistance Provision of funds to help build 20 MeV cyclotron accelerator 
Feasibility studies at El-Dabaa for setting up the country’s first NPP 
(2002) 
Main nuclear research facilities Nuclear Research Center and Reactor Engineering Center, Inshas, 
together with: Nuclear Fuel Research Laboratory, Nuclear 
Chemistry Building, Pilot Milling Facility and Cyclotron Facility 
Nuclear research and training at departments located at Ain Shams 
University, Cairo University, Mansoura University, Tanta University 
Discovery of undeclared material No 
Declared nuclear ambitions September 2006: Intent to pursue large-scale nuclear power 
development with the construction of up to 10 plants in the El-Dabaa 
region 
Signatory to Treaties No participation in the NPT until 1981, but State party to the NPT in 
1982 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1982, but 
refuses to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol. 
Syria 
For several decades, Syria has tried to obtain a nuclear power reactor in vain. Having 
approached the USSR, Belgium, Switzerland, France and China, it ended up with obtaining one 
research reactor from China only. All of its efforts failed due to external pressure from Israel and 
the United States on potential suppliers. 
At present, Syria's nuclear infrastructure is very limited and consists basically of two major 
research centres and a cyclotron. The number of nuclear experts and engineers is relatively low, 
despite continuing technical assistance by the IAEA. Syria ratified the NPT in 1969 and 
advocates a NWFZ in the Middle East. Syria has no power reactor and is incapable to engage in 
conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing capability. Its low-key nuclear research 
infrastructure, inadequate number of trained staff, and insufficient funds do not permit a large 
scale nuclear civilian or military initiative. 
Despite these severe limitations, Syria has been subject of repeated accusations of operating a 
covert nuclear weapon program since 1991. These accusations range from unsupported claims 
by U.S. politicians concerning a covert nuclear weapon program, to hypothesized links with the 
A.Q. Kahn network, and reports of illicit acquisition of enriched nuclear material from Sweden. It 
all culminated in the bombing of a suspected nuclear site at Al-Kibar by Israel in 2007, a facility 
reportedly with characteristics similar to the nuclear facility at Yongbyon (North Korea). 
The current situation in the country with regard to its nuclear ambitions and capabilities, based on 
open literature, is characterized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Summary of Nuclear Characteristics of Syria 
Parameter Characterization 
U supply Significant deposits of phosphate rock at Charkia, Knifes, Sawwaneh, and 
Wadi Qasser Al-Hallabat (60-100 ppm U),  with a commercial fertilizer 
plant and a uranium recovery micro-pilot plant at Homs 
Fuel fabrication No 
Reactors No 
Reprocessing Research reactor SSR-1 (30 kW), mainly used for the production of 
medical isotopes and research 
Waste disposal Radioactive waste management at Der Al-Hadjar 
Clandestine nuclear program 1991: “Credible reports” (by former U.S. Senator Jesse Helms before a 
Senate committee) that China is engaged in furthering the nuclear 
weapons ambitions of Syria and Iran remain unsubstantiated 
1996: Syria’s nuclear research program is at a rudimentary level and 
appears to be aimed at peaceful uses at this time (testimony of John 
Deutch, Director CIA, Senate Government Affairs Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations Weapons Proliferation) 
2003: CIA analysis: Planned congressional testimony of John Bolton 
(U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control) addressing WMD program 
of Syria, is disputed. 
2004 CIA analysis: A.Q. Khan (Pakistan) may have provided Syria with 
nuclear information and equipment; disputed in 2007 by President Bashar 
al-Assad. 
2007:  Israeli airstrike on facility near the Euphrates River in the 
Northeastern region of Dar az Zwar (Al-Kibar), suspected to be the site of 
a partially completed 25MWth gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear 
reactor with Pu-production capability 
Prior to 2009: Iraqi nuclear scientists may have escaped to Syria and are 
collaborating in military nuclear program 
Pu production capability No 
Foreign support 1980s: No success in seeking assistance from USSR, Belgium, 
Switzerland and France to acquire a reactor 
1990: US$ 100 million contract with Argentina cancelled 
1991: 30kW miniature neutron source reactor (SRR-1), built by China at 
the Dayr al-Jajar Nuclear Research Center 
1998, 1999, and 2003: cooperation agreement with Russia for 25 MW 
light water reactor failed to deliver results 
Prior to 2007: Suspected support from North Korea for undisclosed site at 
Al-Kibar, matching the technical design of the Yongbyon reactor (North 
Korea) 
Official support for Iranian 
nuclear program 
Yes 
IAEA assistance 1970 to present: More than 60 technical projects (isotope production, 
nuclear medicine and neutron-activation analysis, uranium exploration, 
uranium extraction from phosphoric acid, construction of a cyclotron 
facility, development of nuclear research laboratories, preparation for a 
nuclear power program) 
1999: Assistance in establishing radioactive waste management 
technology and infrastructure 
2009: Feasibility study and site selection for first nuclear power plant 
Main nuclear research facilities Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center and the Scientific Studies and 
Research Center (SSRC) in Damascus. 
Discovery of undeclared material 2004: Suspected link to disappearance of uranium from company 
Ranstad Mineral (Sweden) via  Syrian trainee 
2009: IAEA inspections revealed the presence of undeclared 
anthropogenic uranium particles from a hot cell facility at the SRR-1 
research reactor in Damascus. 
Declared nuclear ambitions 1982: National plan to construct six 600 MWe reactors by the 1990s 
2007: Announcement of intent of pursuing nuclear power to satisfy 
domestic energy demands 
Signatory to Treaties 1969 NPT 
1992 IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards 
Syria could represent a proliferation risk in the future for the following reasons: 
• IAEA inspections in 2008 raised important questions, such as the discovery of 
undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles. 
• Syria's current path to obtain uranium from significant phosphate deposits, using 
phosphate fertilizer technology, can be extended to industrial scale activities. 
• Syria has engaged previously in WMD activities, such as chemical weapons. 
• Syria is suspected to have the capability of illicit procurement of dual-use, nuclear-
pertinent technology. 
• Syria could be motivated to acquire weapons technology from aboard in view of its 
unresolved security issues and adversarial relationship with Israel. 
Syria has strong political and military links with Iran, and may request assistance in case of a 
security threat from either the United States or Israel. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia represents the lowest level of the four States considered in this analysis in terms of 
nuclear infrastructure. It has no uranium mining or milling industry; its only access to uranium in 
the near future would be uranium extraction from phosphate deposits. In the long term a limited 
uranium supply could originate from uranium ore deposits in the Tabuk Basin. Saudi Arabia has 
no nuclear research or power reactor. The expertise of its nuclear scientists and engineers is 
limited to laboratory-level work on principles of nuclear energy production, isotope production, 
and waste management. 
Saudi Arabia's wealth, due to having about 25 percent of the world's oil reserves on its territory, 
resulted in a budgte surplus of US$149 billion in 2008. This puts the country into a globally 
important strategic position with regard to its reaction to a potentially threatening Iranian nuclear 
weapon program. Also, Saudi Arabia feels threatened by Israeli-Indian defense cooperation, 
since this could lead to an escalation of the regional arms race. 
Until now nothing indicates any illegal or covert activities in the area of a Saudi nuclear weapon 
program. In addition, Saudi Arabia signed the NPT and a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA in 2005. However, it should be noted that this agreement has not entered into 
force. Saudi Arabia is furthermore exempted from regular IAEA inspections, i.e., IAEA's ability is 
significantly reduced to verify that Saudi Arabia's nuclear activities are limited and non-military in 
nature.[3] Furthermore, the country has declared its interest in nuclear energy in August 2009 in 
order to meet its expanding energy needs in an environmentally responsible manner. 
However, Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly subject to claims that it provides significant financial 
support to the development of an Islamic Bomb:[4] $5 billion to Iraq prior to the first Gulf War; and 
$2 billion to Pakistan. In the recent past,Saudi government reportedly had published a strategy 
paper, which advocated the procurement of nuclear weapons.[5] Apart form serving as a 
deterrent this could be useful during negotiations for a NWFZ in the Middle East, a notion which 
Saudi Arabia has supported since 1999. 
The national security situation has been marred by a repeated flare up of terrorist activities, as 
recent as the assassination attempt by a suicide bomber to kill Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the 
Saudi Deputy Interior Minister in charge of the kingdom’s counterterrorism efforts in Jeddah on 
Augusr 28,  2009.  
The current situation in the country with regard to its nuclear ambitions and capabilities, based on 
open literature, is characterized in Table 4. 
Table 4: Summary of Nuclear Characteristics of Saudi Arabia 
Parameter Characterization 
U supply Uranium deposit in Tabuk Basin 
Phosphate deposits (797 million t; 17 to 21 % P2O5) at Al 
Jalamid, Umm Wu’al area, Al Amud, and Sanam area; 
processed at fertilizer plants in Al Jubail Industrial City. 
Fuel fabrication No 
Reactors No 
Reprocessing No 
Waste disposal Temporary Radioactive Waste Storage Facility, nr. King 
Abdulaziz University campus, Jeddah 
Clandestine nuclear program Reportedly Saudi Arabia started a nuclear weapons 
program in 1975 under the command of the Saudi Minister 
of Defence, operated from Al-Khari nuclear research centre 
Financial  support for “Islamic Bomb” (Pakistan: $2 billion 
dollars (1970s and 1980s); Iraq: Up to US$ 5 billion (1985 to 
1990)) 
Pu production capability No 
Reprocessing facility operational None at industrial scale 
Atomic Energy Research Institute: Laboratories with 
potential for reprocessing (Physical Separation Lab, 
Chemical Separation Lab, Radio-chemical Lab) 
Foreign support Cooperation between nuclear researchers at Saudi 
universities and China, Gulf region (e.g., Iraq, Syria), 
Pakistan, Africa, Jordan, Germany, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Taiwan 
May 2008: U.S. offers to assist in developing nuclear 
reactors, training nuclear engineers, and constructing 
nuclear infrastructure 
Official support for Iranian nuclear program No, but avoiding confrontation with Iran over its nuclear 
program 
IAEA assistance Since 1980 in the areas: safe use of radiation sources in 
medicine, industry, research, agriculture, and at educational 
institutions;  national system for preparedness and response 
to radiological emergencies; human health; agriculture; 
isotope hydrology 
Main nuclear research facilities Nuclear research centre in the military complex at Al-
Suleiyel, founded in 1975 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI), King Abdulaziz 
City for Science and Technology (KASCT), Jeddah, 
established in 1988 
3MV General Ionex Tandetron Accelerator at Energy 
Research Laboratory, King Fahd University of Petroleum 
and Minerals (KFUPM), Dhahran 
Cyclotron CS-30 at Cyclotron and Radiopharmaceuticals 
Department, King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research 
Centre, Riyadh 
Discovery of undeclared material No 
Declared nuclear ambitions September 2003: Confidential Strategic Review includes 
potential acquisition of nuclear weapons 
October 2003: "Saudi Arabian officials went to Pakistan and 
are negotiating the purchase of nuclear warheads for their 
land-based missiles," head of Israel Defence Forces' Military 
Intelligence Maj.-Gen. Aharon Ze'evi,  Knesset's Foreign 
Affairs and Defence Committee on 
December 2006: Support for Gulf Cooperation Council 
initiative to develop nuclear energy 
August 2009: announcement of plan for pilot nuclear plant 
Signatory to Treaties Signatory of the NPT in 1988 
Signatory of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; 
agreement has not entered into force 
Saudi Arabia could represent a proliferation risk in the future for the following reasons: 
• Although it is unable to develop an indigenous nuclear weapon program, it can use its 
financial resources to purchase a nuclear device, e.g., from Pakistan. 
• It has demonstrated before to place national security decisions above international 
security relations, when it purchased missiles from China after being rejected by the 
United States to obtain American surface-to-surface missiles.[6] 
If Iran should become a nuclear power, Saudi Arabia will face a two-fold nuclear security threat 
from Israel and Iran and may want to counter with a nuclear weapon system of its own. This could 
be achieved within a relatively short time, if purchased covertly from abroad. 
Conclusions 
Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia have largely differing nuclear infrastructure, political 
systems, and levels of national security. They are subject to controls through the IAEA 
Safeguards mechanism, signatories of the NPT, and advocates of a Middle East free of nuclear 
weapons. Yet, they all could represent nuclear security risks of different magnitudes in the future. 
Algeria, the only African country having experienced nuclear weapon tests on its territory as a 
French colony, has the most advanced nuclear facilities and well trained staff in the region. 
Algeria has identified significant indigenous sources of uranium. Its reactor has produced at least 
50 kg of Pu hitherto. Algeria has almost closed the nuclear fuel cycle, but does not operate any 
industrial-level reprocessing yet. Coupled with the official support of the Iranian declaration of its 
right to reprocessing, it is only a question of when, rather than if, Algeria will intend to close the 
current technological gap in the nuclear fuel cycle. 
The country is suffering from a civil war with a religiously flavoured political component of 
fundamentalism, eroding national stability. In view of the strong influence of the military it cannot 
be excluded that Algeria could view the development of a nuclear weapon as a strategic option to 
strengthen its geopolitical stance in North Africa. 
Egypt, by comparison, has a significantly less developed nuclear infrastructure than Algeria, both, 
in terms of know-how as well as sophistication of nuclear installations. It does have access to a 
sizeable indigenous uranium supply. However, until recently it has been unsuccessful to develop 
its nuclear potential, largely due to the lack of foreign assistance in nuclear technology. 
Egypt has made a truce-like agreement with the political opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which provides for an uneasy calm with the occasional flare up of violent terrorism. It awaits to be 
seen how this will develop further upon the foreseeable change in leadership upon departure of 
the current president Hosni Mubarak and the arrival of his likely successor, son Gamal Mubarak. 
As a recipient of about US$1.5 billion in financial support from the United States and a recently 
signed agreement on nuclear cooperation with China and Australia, it may be able to progress 
significantly in its nuclear ambitions in the future. This is reflected in its recently announced 
ambitious nuclear power program. Its continuing refusal to sign the Additional Protocol, together 
with the nuclear strength of its partners China and Russia, could facilitate the political decision of 
the next leadership to consider a nuclear weapon program as adequate means to match the 
nuclear dominance of its neighbor Israel. Such a development would require a significantly longer 
timeframe than in the case of Algeria. 
Syria is the least developed as compared to Algeria or Egypt in terms of nuclear infrastructure, 
size and training of its engineering and scientific nuclear experts, as well as available financial 
means. It has the potential of developing its uranium resources to an industrial scale, but lacks 
every other component of the nuclear fuel cycle, other than modest activities at the research 
level. 
Syria's leadership ensures national stability through a tight grip on political power. Its international 
political activities are characterized by its support of extreme policies abroad, such as Hezbollah 
in Lebanon and Iranian nuclear policy. So far, it has been unsuccessful in its multiple attempts to 
gain access to advanced nuclear technology from another country. Yet, in 2007 the widely held 
view of having only a nascent nuclear program changed in the aftermath of the bombing of the Al-
Kibar site, when Syria's response left several questions unanswered about the true purpose of 
the site. The worst case scenario would indicate the successful establishment of a clandestine 
acquisition program for advanced nuclear technology from North Korea. Since Syria's relationship 
with its neighbor Israel is strained, any serious deterioration of this volatile situation could drive 
Syria's leadership to the decision to increase its efforts (again?) of covert acquisition of advanced 
nuclear technology outside a civilian nuclear power program. However, in view of the low level of 
its current nuclear capabilities and significant financial constraints due to the lack of any 
significant oil and gas revenues (as compared to Algeria or Saudi Arabia) or external state 
support (as in the case of Egypt), such a program would take considerably longer to deliver a 
nuclear device than in the case of Algeria or Egypt. 
Saudi Arabia has practically no nuclear infrastructure or manpower which would enable it to 
develop an indigenous nuclear weapon within a foreseeable timeframe. However, out of the four 
countries under consideration it has by far the largest financial means at its disposal to simply 
purchase a ready-made nuclear weapon, if it should see a national security necessity for it. It has 
made similar decisions in the past, when it reportedly supported Pakistan and Iraq in their covert 
nuclear weapon programs, and in its purchase of powerful Chinese missile systems. If questions 
are raised about Iran's true nuclear intention—owner of vast oil and gas reserves but claiming to 
need a civilian nuclear program to address its energy needs—this official policy should raise even 
more questions in the case of Saudi Arabia. Not only has it the largest oil reserves on a global 
scale, it could also provide a significant portion of its energy needs through solar energy. 
In summary, provided there is the political will to develop a military nuclear program, adequate 
financial means and external scientific/technical support, a country like Algeria or Egypt, less 
likely so Syria, could engage successfully in such an endeavor within the next decade. After all, it 
took Israel only four years from the completion of the nuclear research facility at Dimona to the 
first assembly of an improvised rudimentary, but operational, nuclear weapon. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia there would only be a short time interval between its political decision to become a 
nuclear power and the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon. For example, the Kingdom could 
simply buy a ready-made Pakistani nuclear military device. Seeing that an international nuclear 
market operated successfully out of Pakistan under the management of A. Q. Khan for years, 
such an approach could have a reasonably high probability of success. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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